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1 Introduction
Between 1960 and 2000 income inequality in the United States soared, to levels
not seen since the Depression era1. The employed population doubled over
the same period [Figure 1]. This paper argues that the two phenomena are
linked, with the widening income distribution a consequence of greater division
of labor. This in turn was facilitated by the increase in employment, as well as
by specialization-biased technical change. The theoretical mechanism suggested
is novel, and moreover is consistent with another striking fact regarding the US
income distribution: its collapse over the first half of the twentieth century2.
Agents are assumed to trade oﬀ the productivity and price implications
of specialization, with the result that market size, appropriately defined, is
crucial for the return to ability. In thin markets each agent perceives insuﬃcient
demand for the output that would flow from a narrow production focus; as
a result general ability is most valuable. In larger markets such demand is
perceived, agents focus accordingly and the return to specialist skills is high.
Market growth, due to increased population or to technical change, will alter
the reward structure of the economy in favour of superstars with highly specific
skills, while the relative earnings of multi-talented renaissance men will fall.
A feature of the model is the presence of two distinct aspects of ability.
Agents j may diﬀer in their fundamental productivity αj and in their return to
specialization δj . The former is their total output when producing the maximal
range of varieties of good; the latter is the rate at which this output rises as they
narrow their range of activity3. Having two dimensions of skill allows a parsi-
monious explanation of the observed U-shaped timepath of earnings inequality.
Indeed, one of the forces driving the recent spread in the income distribution
- namely specialization-biased technical change, or an increase in average δj -
may be responsible for the initial fall in inequality.
Most existing work on the US income distribution focuses on the recent rise
in wage diﬀerentials. This development has attracted understandable atten-
tion, coinciding as it has with a broad increase in educational attainment and
the demographic bulge caused by the baby boomers. Authors using a supply-
and-demand [S-D] labor market framework have therefore inferred a significant
increase in the relative demand for characteristics such as education and experi-
ence4. This skill-biased technical change is thought by some to have its roots in a
1 In this paper income is synonymous with earnings. See Atkinson (2003) for a discussion
of the importance of income sources outside of wages.
2Consistent data series covering the whole century are not available. However, Goldin and
Katz (1999) conclude from a range of sources that earnings inequality in 1900 exceeded that
in 1940, i.e. before the ‘Great Compression’ of mid-century, described by Goldin and Margo
(1992) and detailed in Figure 1. Empirical work in this area is discussed further in Section 4.
3The ‘superstar’ and ’renaissance man’ assignations are for the high-δj and high-αj agents
respectively. Note that I do not use labels such as ‘specialist’ and ‘generalist’ to distinguish
between agents with diﬀerent skill endowments, as these refer to actions rather than abilities.
As will be seen, superstars may in equilibrium produce a broader range of goods, despite
having more specialised skills.
4 See Katz & Autor (2000) and Acemoglu (2002) for comprehensive reviews of the empirical
and theoretical literatures that use the S-D framework.
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microprocessor-led technological revolution [Autor et al. (1998), Caselli (1999),
Dunne at al. (2000)], while others have emphasized more general capital-skill
complementarity [Stokey (1996), Krusell et al. (1997)] and changes in organi-
zational structure [Snower (1999)].
Rather than examine industry- or economy-wide labor demand curves, I
consider individual specialization decisions. A prior of the model is that each
agent’s total output increases as he produces a narrower range of the symmetric
varieties of good. This may be thought either to be due to pure diseconomies
of scope or to arise as individuals focus on tasks at which they are naturally
gifted. The other basic assumption is that agents consider their local impact
on prices. They play Cournot in their individual production markets but take
aggregate variables as given, a general equilibrium approach to modelling imper-
fect competition also taken by Neary (2003). The consequent tension between
high productivity and high price per unit of output is at the core of the model.
Two key results with respect to the income distribution are generated. The
first regards the importance of market size, defined as total output deflated by
average fundamental productivity. The larger the market, the more important
is return to specialization δj for one’s equilibrium earnings. A corollary is that
a rise in the proportion of high-δj agents - which will increase market size - will
tend to raise such agents’ relative income. This is obviously diﬀerent to the
conclusion reached using the S-D approach, and aﬀords a powerful explanation
for the recent behavior of the US income distribution.
The second key result concerns technical change. While fundamental pro-
ductivity progress is distribution-neutral, an increase in the average return to
specialization δ has two separate implications. It will lower the cross-sectional
return to fundamental productivity αj , holding market size constant. It will also
increase market size and by implication the salience of heterogeneity along the
δj dimension. This provides the mechanism by which the U-shaped timepath
for US inequality may be generated. Secular increase in δ can imply an initial
collapse, then a spread in the income distribution as the market grows, with the
latter process accelerated by any increase in employed population5.
5One could generate the observed timepath for income inequality simply by assuming that
technical change somehow favours those who are initially poor. Take a simple example with
two dimensions of skill called ‘Brains’ and ‘Smarts’. Assume that all agents high in Brains
are necessarily low in Smarts, and vice versa; assume further that Smarts are initially more
important for productivity, but technical progress favours Brains. Then we would observe
falling, then rising inequality as the Brainiacs first catch up with, then outstrip the Smarties.
The hypothesis advanced below is more subtle. It is instead that the distributional impact
of technical progress will depend on which skill dimension is currently most important; and,
moreover, that such progress will alter the relative salience of the two dimensions. Put another
way, the simple Brains/Smarts story relies on the negative correlation between Brains and
Smarts across agents. I need no such correlation to generate the U-shaped timepath for
inequality, and in the simulations below assume the agent-specific αj and δj skill parameters
are independently distributed.
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1.1 Related Literature
An obvious predecessor is Rosen’s (1981) model of superstars, which provides a
diﬀerent mechanism by which some individuals benefit disproportionately from
access to large markets. There is also the vast literature on the division of labor
beginning with Smith (1776). The emphasis there, in a wide range of contexts,
has been on the return to specialization as some sort of Marshallian externality
- see for example Romer (1987). Here in contrast the pure productivity benefits
of specialization are fully internalized6. Closer in spirit is the research pro-
gramme of Xiaokai Yang and coauthors [Borland and Yang (1991,1992), Yang
and Ng (1993), Yang (2001)], who consider the trade oﬀ between internal scope
diseconomies and transaction costs associated with exchange7. The most direct
antecedent is Baumgardner (1988a), who as here focuses on the tension between
the productivity benefits and price implications of product focus. His is a partial
equilibrium framework in which the demand curves facing the individual agents
are given, which leads to the result that an increase in the number of producers
tends to reduce the degree of specialization. This is opposite to the result in gen-
eral equilibrium below. Also, producers are identical in Baumgardner’s model,
while here the focus is on agent heterogeneity and the income distribution.
Mitchell (2001) does consider the distributional impact of specialization. He
argues that capital flexibility - its ability to engage in multiple tasks - was
U-shaped over the twentieth century. In the first half it declined, which led to
increased optimal plant size. This in turn implied greater division of labor, which
in his model reduces the skill premium because high-skilled workers are those
with a lower fixed cost per task. In the second half of the century, he maintains,
capital flexibility increased to opposite eﬀect. He does not explicitly consider
the role of market size and population growth. Moreover, in his model increased
labor specialization always reduces inequality, whereas a central message here
is that the opposite may be true. Finally, the extra degree of freedom aﬀorded
here by two dimensions of ability renders unnecessary an assumption of a mid-
century reversal in the nature of technical progress. A U-shaped timepath for
the spread of earnings will naturally be generated as an economy changes from
one where general ability is rewarded to one where specialist skills are most
valuable8.
6No new mechanism by which diseconomies of scope arise is oﬀered here. Adam Smith
(1776) provided three rationales for their existence: learning-by-doing, time saved switching
between tasks and greater ability to invent specialised machinery. Becker and Murphy (1992)
suggest that firms are devices to coordinate the actions of workers endowed with disparate,
specialised bodies of knowledge; implicit is that workers have limited cognitive ability and
are best suited to a narrow range of tasks. Alfred Marshall, closely associated with external
economies, also argued for the existence of internal returns to specialisation. Marshall (1910)
writes extensively on internal economies of scale, but those he identifies are isomorphic to
diseconomies of scope: large-scale production permits specialised machinery to be introduced
and individual workers to specialise in their tasks. In a similar vein Young (1928) argues that
‘it would be wasteful to make a hammer to drive a single nail’. Increasing returns in a single
task, for example due to a fixed cost - as Marshall and Young seem to have had in mind - will
imply diseconomies of scope for a given amount of labour. See Edwards and Starr (1987).
7 See also Kim (1989) and Weitzman (1994).
8 In Mitchell (2001) population growth would presumably lead to more specialisation and
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the general model.
Section 3 introduces the specific dimensions of ability discussed above, and con-
siders in turn the implications of heterogeneity along each. Section 4 considers
empirical evidence and shows how, with heterogeneity along both dimensions at
once, the model is able to mimic the long-run timepath of the US income dis-
tribution. Section 5 concludes. Derivations of key results are in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider the following repeated one-period economy. There is a continuum of
symmetric varieties of good arranged around the unit circle, and a mass of size
n of agents. One may think of each good as a separate task that contributes
towards production of a composite good for final consumption. Each agent j is
endowed with a single unit of labor, derives utility only from consumption and
has homothetic preferences of the form Uj =
R
i∈G u
¡
cij
¢
di, where cij is agent j’s
consumption of variety i, G the variety space and u (.) a homogeneous felicity
function with the usual properties.
There are two dimensions to agent j’s production decision. He must choose
the set Rj ⊂ G of varieties he will produce, where Rj is a segment of the
variety circle, and how much of each variety i ∈ Rj to bring to market. Agents
are distributed evenly around the circle such that there is a mass n at each
point. An agent’s location indicates his central competence in production, with
technology such that Rj must be centred on this variety.
The core assumption of the model is that j’s labor productivity a (rj) is
decreasing in rj , the length of the segment Rj :Z
i∈Rj
xijdi = aj (rj) (1)
aj (.) > 0, aj
0 (.) < 0
where xij is j’s output of variety i. Denote the absolute elasticity of labor
productivity with respect to the product range as − rj
aj(rj)
daj(rj)
drj
= εaj (rj) > 0.
I assume throughout that εaj (.) is less than one and non-decreasing in rj .
Note that εaj (.) is indexed by j. I allow the labor productivity function to
vary across agents, but require that the distribution of agent types be identical
across locations on the variety circle. There will be no tendency for high-ability
agents to produce diﬀerent goods to low-ability ones.
lower the skill premium, the opposite conclusion to that reached here. Mitchell and Holmes
(2003) develop the ideas regarding fixed costs and plant size, but without any role for labour
specialisation. They argue that capital is to unskilled labour as unskilled labour is to skilled:
a substitute with higher setup costs per task. They then argue that increased plant size has
an ambiguous eﬀect on the skill premium. While it leads firms to substitute unskilled workers
for skilled, it also leads them to replace the unskilled with capital; demand for skilled relative
to unskilled labour could then rise or fall with market size. Both Mitchell (2001) and Mitchell
and Holmes (2003) focus on plant-based production in manufacturing, while the model here is
perhaps more generally applicable across sectors. Neither captures the idea that individuals
with highly specific skills may flourish in large markets.
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Agents ignore their eﬀects on the aggregate variables but play Cournot in
their production markets. When acting as consumers, though, they take all
prices as given. Since preferences are homothetic, aggregate consumption be-
havior can be modelled as resulting from the decisions of a representative agent.
The inverse demand function for variety k is then:
pk =
u0
¡
xk
¢R
i∈G x
iu0 (xi) di
Y (2)
where Y is aggregate income and xi =
R n
0
xijdj is total output of variety i, with
xij = 0 if i /∈ Rj . Since producers ignore the aggregate impact of placing more
output of a variety on the market, both Y and the denominator in (2) are held
constant when computing the perceived elasticity of inverse demand:
−x
k
pk
δpk
δxk
= −
xku00
¡
xk
¢
u0 (xk)
= εp. (3)
Homotheticity of preferences guarantees that εp is constant, with standard as-
sumptions on u (.) guaranteeing that 0 < εp ≤ 1.
2.1 The individual production decision given rj
Agent j seeks to maximize his utility from consumption subject to the produc-
tion constraint (1). The implied maximand is:
Γj = V (P, Yj)− λ
"Z
i∈Rj
xijdi− aj (rj)
#
(4)
with V (P, Yj) his indirect utility function, P the vector of all variety prices and
Yj =
R
i∈Rj p
ixijdi his nominal income. Diﬀerentiating with respect to x
i
j and
using Roy’s identity yields the first order conditions given a choice of production
range rj :
δΓ
δxij
=
δV (P, Yj)
δYj
·
pi +
£
xij − cij
¤ δpi
δxi
¸
− λ
= 0 ∀i ∈ Rj . (5)
Agents do not simply equate marginal revenue across markets - and thereby
maximize income - but take account of the price implications of their behavior
for their budget set; hence the appearance of cij on the right-hand-side of (5).
Note the use of the Cournot conjecture that δp
i
δxij
= δp
i
δxi .
2.2 Choice of rj
I consider only symmetric equilibria, where identical agents make the same
choices regarding product range and output per variety. Given identical distri-
butions of agent types across variety locations, this restricts attention to equilib-
ria where total output of each variety is the same: xi = x, pi = p, ∀i ∈ G. The
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first-order conditions (5) above then imply that in any equilibrium each agent
places the same amount of output on each of his markets: xij = xj , ∀i ∈ Rj .
This implies the following first-order condition for optimal choice of rj :
λ
da (rj)
drj
− xj
·
xj
δp
δx
¸
δV (P, Yj)
δYj
= 0 (6)
The basic trade-oﬀ facing each agent is captured in (6). Recall that λ is
the shadow value of an extra unit of output. The first term above is the utility
impact of the fall in labor productivity that accompanies an increase in product
range. The second term measures the gain, again in terms of utility, of spreading
a given amount of output across a greater number of markets and raising the
revenue obtained. This trade-oﬀ, between the productivity and price eﬀects of
specialization, is at the heart of the model.
Finally, use (5) to substitute for λ in (6) to get the condition characterizing
each agent’s optimal market share. This is given in Result 1, which uses the
fact that cij = cj = rjxj in symmetric equilibrium
9.
Result 1 An aggregate equilibrium is characterized by total output per variety
of x and each agent j producing the same amount xj of each variety in
his production set Rj :
xj
x
=
1
εp
· ε
a
j (rj)
1 + εaj (rj) [1− rj ]
∀j. (7)
Equation (7) implicitly defines agent j’s optimal market share and product
range, given the output of others. ¥
It is clear that, since optimality involves a target for j’s market share, j’s
specialization decision depends on specialization decisions elsewhere. The di-
vision of labor is limited by the extent of the market [Smith (1776)], which is
limited in turn by the division of labor [Young (1928)]. The following corollary
is immediate.
Corollary 1.1 Suppose all agents are identical so that aj (rj) = a (rj), ∀j, and
that the elasticity of productivity with respect to the product range is
constant: εaj (rj) = ε
a. Then each agent chooses rj = r, where:
r =
εp
n+ εp
· 1 + ε
a
εa
. (8)
Per capita output is given by x
n
= a (r), with each agent’s market share
xj
x
= 1
rn
. ¤
9Note that Γj is in fact discontinuous at equilibrium rj ,since if j increases his product
range any further he goes from markets with output of (x− xj) to ones with output of x in
his absence. There may therefore be other equilibria in the neighbourhood of that defined by
Result 1. I focus throughout on equilibria where (6) is satisfied exactly for all agents.
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The situation with identical agents and constant εa reveals some more gen-
eral predictions of the model. The more sensitive are prices to output changes
or the less sensitive is productivity to increases in product range, the less spe-
cialized will agents be in equilibrium. The greater the mass of agents n, the
greater the degree of specialization and the higher the per capita output level -
the higher is n, the smaller is each agent relative to the aggregate economy and
the closer he comes to being a price-taker. As a result he perceives that he can
concentrate his productive eﬀorts on a few markets without overly depressing
prices.
Note that aggregate increasing returns arise in this economy in the absence
of any explicit externalities such as technological spillovers. Agents interact only
through aggregate demand. The equilibrium is ineﬃcient, as each agent ignores
the eﬀects of his own specialization decision on those of others; eﬃciency would
require each agent specializing completely, with rj → 0. The model exhibits
strategic complementarities as defined by Cooper and John (1988).
3 Market size, technical change and the return
to ability
I introduce potential heterogeneity along two dimensions and assume agent j’s
labor productivity function takes the following form:
aj (rj) =
(
fj
³
rj
1−rj
´
rj ∈ (0, 12 ]
0 rj >
1
2
(9)
where the agent-specific function fj (.) is increasing and homogeneous of degree
−dj in its argument, with dj < 1. Let the fundamental productivity parameter
αj = fj (1) denote j’s total output at the maximal product range. To simplify
notation define δj =
dj
1+dj
∈
¡
0, 12
¢
; the return to specialization δj thus indexes
the rate at which output increases as j narrows his production locus. There is
potential cross-sectional variation along both dimensions of ability: αj = λjα
and δj = µjδ, where α and δ are the respective economy-wide averages and λj
and µj are agent-specific constants.
For the rest of the paper I assume that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, so
that εp = 1. Substituting εaj (rj) =
δj
1−δj · 11−rj into (7) we have an equation
that implicitly defines agent j’s optimal market share, given the output of other
agents:
xj
x
= δj
1
1− rj
. (10)
The following result characterizes aggregate equilibrium when agents’ market
shares satisfy (10).
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Result 2 Assume δn > λj
µj
, ∀j. With technology given by (9) total equilibrium
output x is implicitly characterized by:
1 =
Z n
0
δj
·
δjx
αj
¸δj−1
dj =
Z n
0
µjδ
·
µjδ
λj
· x
α
¸µjδ−1
dj (11)
with each agent’s total output and choice of product range in turn given
by:
aj (rj) = λjα
·
µjδ
λj
· x
α
¸µjδ
(12)
1
rj
= 1 +
·
µjδ
λj
· x
α
¸1−µjδ
. (13)
The assumption on δn guarantees that all agents choose an internal prod-
uct range rj ∈
¡
0, 12
¢
. ¥
Without further assumptions regarding the distributions of the λj and µj ,
(11) does not readily yield an explicit solution for x
n
. It is simple nonetheless
to confirm, absent any such assumptions, that per capita output is increasing
in α, δ and n. Once again there are increasing returns in the aggregate: in the
absence of heterogeneity - with λj = µj = 1, ∀j - equilibrium output per head
is x
n
= α [δn]
δ
1−δ .
The following corollary to Result 2 provides an expression for the skill pre-
mium.
Corollary 2.1 Let τ (h, l) = rhxh
rlxl
be the equilibrium income ratio of two agents
h and l. Then:
τ (h, l) =
·
λh
λl
¸1−µlδ ·µh
µl
¸µlδ ·µhδ
λh
· x
α
¸[µh−µl]δ
(14)
In the rest of the paper I typically assume that h is the more productive
agent in equilibrium, so that τ (h, l) > 1. ¤
Of particular relevance for τ (h, l) is x
α
, total economy output deflated by
average fundamental productivity. One may think of this as a market size term.
Again from Result 2 we have the following:
Corollary 2.2 Equilibrium market size x
α
is increasing in the number of agents
n and the return to specialization δ, but orthogonal to fundamental pro-
ductivity α. Total output x is linearly increasing in α. ¤
The orthogonality of equilibrium x
α
to α can be seen from (11), which im-
plicitly gives a unique solution for x
α
in terms of the δ, λj and µj parameters
only. As a result the specialization decision and therefore τ (h, l) are also inde-
pendent of α. Holding constant choices of product range, a change in α does
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not alter the ratio of an individual agent’s productive capacity to that of the
economy as a whole. With homothetic preferences it is this ratio that is key for
the specialization decision, since under such preferences the elasticity of inverse
demand is independent of the scale of the economy.
We therefore have the first result of interest with respect to the skill premium:
Corollary 2.3 Changes in economy-wide fundamental productivity α do not
aﬀect τ (h, l). ¤
I postpone further analysis of (14), as it is instructive first to consider the
determinants of τ (h, l) with each dimension of heterogeneity shut down in turn.
3.1 Renaissance men
Suppose agents diﬀer only in their fundamental productivity, with µj = 1, ∀j,
so that δ is the common return to specialization. Explicit solutions for output
per head, a (rj) and rj may then be retrieved from Result 2:
x
n
= eλα [δn] δ1−δ (15)
a (rj) = λ
1−δ
j
eλδα [δn] δ1−δ (16)
1
rj
= 1 +
·
λjeλ
¸δ−1
δn (17)
where eλ = h 1
n
R n
o
λ1−δj dj
i 1
1−δ
. The skill premium is therefore:
τ (h, l) =
·
λh
λl
¸1−δ
> 1⇔ λh > λl. (18)
Unsurprisingly, high-λj agents produce more in equilibrium. This is despite
being less specialized than low-λj agents, as can be seen from (17). The greater
diversification of highly productive agents is easily understood: if they were
to focus their output on only a few markets, the downward pressure on prices
would be larger than for the less productive. High-λj agents therefore spread
their talents more thinly. They are equilibrium generalists, despite sharing the
return to specialization δ with low-λj agents.
It is clear from (14) that, with δ common, τ (j, k) is independent of market
size x
α
. This is reflected in the absence of n from (18) above, the intuition for
which is as follows. Each agent has a target market share given by (10). As the
mass of agents n rises, the output that an individual places on a given market
in order to hit this target market share also rises. When agents share the same
return to specialization, this move towards greater output on fewer markets
favours neither disproportionately. To see this, note that the homogeneity of
fj (.) means one may write rjεaj (rj) = gj (aj (rj)), where gj (.) is a function
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homogeneous of degree
1−µjδ
µjδ
. Then use (10) to write the income ratio for two
agents h and l as:
τ (h, l) =
rhxh
rlxl
=
1− µhδ
1− µlδ
· gh (ah (rh))
gl (al (rl))
(19)
⇐⇒ gh (τ (h, l))
τ (h, l)
= gl (1) iff µh = µl. (20)
The second line (20) holds only if µh = µl, in which case it implicitly defines a
unique τ (h, l) independent of the scale of ah (rh) and al (rl). If market size rises
due to an increase in n, implying greater specialization and output per head,
the skill premium is unaﬀected so long as gh (.) and gl (.) are homogeneous of
the same degree10 .
The next two subsections consider factors that do influence the skill premium
when µh = µl = 1.
3.1.1 Geographical sorting and inequality
In Appendix 6.3 I consider the eﬀect of costly migration between distinct local
economies. Agents prefer economies characterized either by higher n or greater
average productivity, as there they are closer to being price-takers and more
able to specialize. The key assumption made is of a fixed cost of migration.
This leads to high-λj agents being more likely to migrate; while their relative
income is unchanged by an increase in market size, their absolute gain is greater.
This sorting of high-λj agents into large markets has two implications. First,
it increases the incomes both of the high-λj migrants and of the (high- or low-
λj) agents already incumbent in migrants’ destinations. Second, it reduces the
productivity of the low-λj agents left behind, as their markets become smaller
and they specialize less - the ‘ghost-town’ eﬀect. Absent strong assumptions
on the initial location patterns of agent types, there is thus a tendency towards
increased income dispersion as an economy urbanizes, as the US continued to
do over the course of the twentieth century.
This broad hypothesis has empirical support. Glaeser and Mare (2001) find
that cities tend to be inhabited by the relatively highly-skilled, and that urban
10This may seem a knife-edge result, dependent on the particular form taken by aj (rj)
in (9). If one assumed that agents ignored the price implications of diversification for their
budget set, and instead simply maximised income, the equilibrium condition (7) would not
have the correction [1− rj ] for consumption on the right-hand-side, and would instead read:
xj
x
= 1
εp
εaj (rj)
1+εaj (rj)
. Then, were (9) instead a constant-elasticity function of the form aj (rj) =
αj [rj ]
−
bδj
1−bδj , one could again write τ (h, l) = 1−bδh
1−bδl · rhε
a
h(rh)
rlεal (rl)
=
bgh(ah(rh))bgl(al(rl)) . Similar reasoning
would apply: with bδh = bδl, the functions bgh (.) and bgl (.) would be homogeneous of the same
degree and the skill premium would be independent of the size of the market. In general,
one can regard the specification in (9) as ‘correcting’ for the consumption-price impact of
diversification. The results generated are analogous to those when εaj (rj) is a constant and
agents are naive income-maximisers.
11
productivity remains higher than non-urban even when skill levels are controlled
for. Garicano and Hubbard (2004) report that lawyers are more likely to work
in hierarchical firms when the local market is larger; they argue that this is
because such firm structures facilitate specialization. Baumgardner (1988b)
finds that individual physicians tend to oﬀer a narrower range of services in
larger local markets. Duranton and Jayet (2004) provide evidence from France
that scarce occupations are over-represented in large cities. Finally, a feature of
the widening income distribution in the US over the late twentieth century was
the falling real wages of those in the lower tail, consistent with the ghost-town
eﬀect mentioned above.
3.1.2 Change in δ and inequality
Consider again a unitary economy. Apart from explicit skill-biased technical
progress - change in λj
λk
- the remaining source of variation in τ (j, k) is variation
in δ. From (18) it is clear that a falling return to specialization would imply a
gradual spread in the income distribution, one with the fractal quality observed
in US data. We saw from (17) that relatively low-skilled, low-λj agents are
more specialized in equilibrium - the sole ‘advantage’ of being low-skilled. A fall
in δ erodes this advantage relative to the high-λj renaissance men11,as then in
equilibrium all agents are less specialized and the fundamental productivity pa-
rameters relatively more important. This result mirrors that in Mitchell (2001),
where inequality also varied inversely with the division of labor.
3.2 Superstars
Now consider cross-sectional variation only in the return to specialization µjδ,
with fundamental productivity identical across agents so that λj = 1, αj = α,
∀j. Equilibrium xg
α
is implicitly defined by:
1 =
Z n
0
µjδ
h
µjδ ·
x
α
iµjδ−1
dj. (21)
The income ratio is now:
τ (h, l) =
·
µh
µl
¸µlδ h
µhδ ·
x
α
i[µh−µl]δ
> 1⇔ µh > µl. (22)
The skill premium aﬀorded high-µj agents will unambiguously rise with mar-
ket size x
α
. This is the superstars phenomenon. Agents with a particularly high
return to specialization are the most restricted by thin, low- x
α
markets, where
there is insuﬃcient demand for the output that would result if they were to
focus on their core competence. In large markets there is such demand and
11 It is worth emphasising that a fall in δ in no way implies technological regress. As long
as aj
¡
rj
¢
does not fall for any given rj , it is reasonable to consider the possibility that δ
falls over time as α rises. The parameter indexes agents’ productivity when focused relative
to their productivity when diversified, and conjectures regarding δ’s evolution are conjectures
about the nature of technical progress.
12
they focus accordingly. High-µj superstars have the most to gain from a move
towards greater output of fewer varieties12 . In the terms of the discussion in
Section 3.1, the gh (.) and gl (.) functions are no longer homogeneous of the same
degree.
If agents diﬀer only in their returns to specialization, then upward trends in
either n or in δ, each of which will raise x
α
, will imply a spread of the income
distribution13. This is quite diﬀerent to the case outlined in Section 3.1, where
the sole source of cross-sectional variation was the fundamental productivity
parameter λj . Below I consider the implications for the income distribution of
heterogeneity along both dimensions simultaneously. The results of the current
section are first summarized.
Summary In a unitary economy the eﬀects of n and δ on the skill premium
depend crucially on the nature of heterogeneity:
• If agents vary only in their fundamental productivity parameter λjα, then
τ (h, l) is unaﬀected by n, decreasing in δ and independent of α.
• If agents vary only in their return to specialization µjδ, then τ (h, l) is
increasing in both n and δ but remains independent of α.
Meanwhile sorting may raise income inequality, as high-ability agents move
to urban areas to the detriment of those left behind.
4 Multidimensional heterogeneity and the US
income distribution
There is much indirect evidence for the ideas contained above. In terms of a
causal relationship between productivity and specialization, it seems incontro-
vertible that individuals have particular natural talents and are better at some
activities than others; as for pure diseconomies of scope, Gollop (1997) finds
that decreasing product heterogeneity at plant level is second only to technical
change in accounting for productivity growth in manufacturing14. With respect
to a link between market size and the extent of individual specialization, there
12The arguments made in Section regarding the eﬀect of geographical sorting can be made
here. With fixed migration costs one would expect high-µj agents to be most likely to cluster
in urban areas, thus increasing their productivity advantage in equilibrium.
13 Inspection of (22) reveals that higher δ in fact raises τ (h, l) for a given market size. One
might therefore think that using the specification δj = µjδ and consider rising δ is rather
loading the dice in favour of the high-µj agents. It is easy to show that τ (h, l) remains an
increasing function of δ under the alternative specification δj = δ+εj , with εj the idiosyncratic
ability term.
14This is likely to understate the role of specialisation, as Gollop includes economies of
scale as a determinant of plant productivity. While diseconomies of scope are conceptually
distinct from scale economies, the two may be closely related - see footnote 6. An argument
could also be made that technical change is induced by specialisation, for example due to
learning-by-doing [Arrow (1962)].
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is the evidence of Baumgardner (1988b), Duranton and Jayet (2004) and Gari-
cano and Hubbard (2004) cited above. At a more aggregate level, Baldwin et al.
(2001) document a shift towards greater firm- and plant-level specialization in
Canadian manufacturing since the 1970s, and report that the shift was greatest
in plants which moved most strongly into export markets following the 1989
Free Trade Agreement with the United States.
Evidence for a link between market size and wage diﬀerentials is perhaps less
compelling, if only due to empirical diﬃculties. There is the developing country
phenomenon of increased inequality following trade liberalization15, but there
the water is muddied by the fact that there are often concurrent labor market
reforms. Factor content studies of the impact of increased trade on the wages
of the low-skilled in the United States typically conclude that there is a most a
small eﬀect [Freeman (1995)], although these have been criticized on the grounds
that they do not capture price eﬀects unrelated to trade volumes [Lawrence
(1994), Deardorﬀ and Hakura (1994)]. In this paper the market size mechanism
works entirely through prices, and lower trade barriers would potentially aﬀect
the earnings distribution even if actual trade flows were negligible. Moreover,
most studies of the distributional impact of trade work in the S-D framework
discussed in the Introduction, and as such make implicit identifying assumptions
that would be inappropriate here16 .
Direct empirical tests of the results above are made diﬃcult by the fact
that it is not clear to which observable variables the separate ability dimensions
correspond17. The range of tasks rj in which each agent is engaged is also
diﬃcult to measure. Even if rough estimates of rj were available, inferring the
agent-specific λj and µj parameters would not be straightforward, as it is not
always the case that high-µj agents are the most specialized in equilibrium - see
the discussion in Appendix 6.2.2.
I instead turn to simulation, and argue that the model above is able to
provide a parsimonious explanation for the long-term behavior of the US earn-
ings distribution. In particular it is able to reproduce the distribution’s initial
collapse and subsequent expansion over the twentieth century, as reported by
Goldin and Margo (1992) and Goldin and Katz (1999). The former take as their
starting point the ‘Great Compression’ of the US wage structure over the 1940s,
during which the log-wage-diﬀerential between the 90th and 10th percentiles fell
from 1.45 to 1.18 and the variance of log wages fell from 0.325 to 0.259. The
following passage is reproduced from Goldin and Margo:
The wage structure...has been on a long-run roller-coaster ride since
15Attanasio et al. (2004) compare the distributional impact of the Colombian trade reforms
of the late 1980s and early 1990s with the earlier experience in Mexico. Pavcnik et al. (2002)
consider the case of Brazil.
16For example, Pavcnik et al. (2002) find that the rise in the skill premium in Brazil fol-
lowing trade liberalisation was not due to Hecksher-Ohlin-type adjustments. They necessarily
conclude that the trade reforms must have induced skill-biased technical change.
17Both broad-based and narrow ability are presumably useful for educational attainment,
although one could argue that the latter becomes more important as an individual proceeds
into higher education. Similarly, it is not clear a priori the proportions in which δj and αj
rise with experience.
14
1940 - with inequality falling precipitously during the 1940s, rising
slightly during the 1950s and 1960s, and finally increasing sharply
from the 1970s. The statistical properties of the initial fall and
recent rise are, in many ways, mirror images of each other. Not only
did the between-group variance change in comparable but opposite
ways, but the decrease in the within-group variance in the 1940s
was of similar magnitude to the increase in the post-1960s period.
[Goldin and Margo (1992), p.3]
Goldin and Katz focus on the pre-1940s period, and use a variety of sources
to show that US wage dispersion at the beginning of the century was even greater
than at the end of the 1930s. They infer a narrowing of the wage structure that
probably pre-dated the early 1920s, and that was more than twice as large as the
1940s compression in terms of the 90-10 log wage diﬀerential. The overall picture
then, is of two significant compressions of the wage distribution that occurred
around the two World Wars, followed by a gradual increase in inequality that
accelerated when the baby-boomers approached their prime.
How to explain this in the current framework? Section 3.1.1 above suggested
that geographical sorting could exacerbate inequality. However, such sorting
cannot explain the collapse in the income distribution over the first half of
the twentieth century, while the US urbanization process was in full flow. An
alternative explanation provided by Sections 3.1 and 3.1.2 is the existence of
heterogeneity along a single dimension, coupled with a mid-century reversal
in the nature of technical change, as in Mitchell (2001). In the model here,
assuming a hump-shaped path for δ would deliver the observed U-shaped path
for inequality if the (relative) fundamental productivity parameters λj were the
sole source of diﬀerence. One could equally suppose heterogeneity lay only in
the µj parameters governing individual (relative) returns to specialization, in
which case a U-shaped path for δ would generate the same result.
It is not necessary to invoke any such qualitative break in the path for δ
in order to explain falling and then rising inequality. Assume instead cross-
sectional variation both in fundamental productivity λjα and in the return to
specialization µjδ, with the expression for the income ratio of two agents h and
l reproduced here for convenience:
τ (h, l) =
·
λh
λl
¸1−µlδ ·µh
µl
¸µlδ ·µhδ
λh
· x
α
¸[µh−µl]δ
. (23)
Now consider the impact of secular, specialization-biased technical change, bear-
ing in mind the conclusions of the previous section. The implications for the
income distribution depend on the source, at any point in time, of income in-
equality. Suppose that initially the upper tiers of the distribution are comprised
of high-λj renaissance men; this could be because market size xα is small, agents
are not specialized and so variation along the µj dimension is less important for
relative productivity. Then by the results of Section 3.1.2 an increase in δ should
narrow the income distribution, favouring as it does the low-λj agents. There
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is a second eﬀect: as δ rises so will x
α
, and the µj dimension becomes the more
salient. As this continues the high-µj superstars will eventually constitute the
rich, with further increases in δ serving to widen their productivity advantage
in equilibrium. It is easy to see how this could generate the required timepath
for inequality.
I also investigate the eﬀect of varying n, which will influence the wage distri-
bution via its impact on market size. It is notable that the two periods of wage
compression were also periods of conflict when many working-age males were
not in the labor force and global trade was disrupted; and that the fastest rise
in wage inequality came after the baby boom18. These discrete demographic
events occurred against a background of consistent US urbanization19 and a
gradual dismantling of global trade barriers, both of which may be thought of
as raising n and in turn x
α
.
4.1 Simulations
Unless otherwise stated, all simulations assume that the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity parameters µj and λj are uniformly and independently distributed, over
[0.75, 1.25] and [0.2, 1.8] respectively. Aggregate fundamental productivity α is
normalized to one. Figure 2 shows how per capita output increases in δ and in
n. Figure 3 graphs the log-wage ratio of the 75th and 25th percentiles against
the same variables; inequality is increasing in n and U-shaped in δ as predicted.
The same is true when other measures of dispersion such as the coeﬃcient of
variation and alternative percentile ranges are used.
The same pattern is displayed in Figure 4, which simulates the log-wage
ratio of the 90th and 10th percentiles from 1900 to 2000. Secular specialization-
biased technical progress is assumed, with δ increasing by 0.03 each decade.
Two timepaths for the dispersion measure are simulated: one assuming n = 100
throughout, one with growth in n calibrated to match the historical growth in
US civilian employment. Each replicates the narrowing of the income distribu-
tion over the first half of the century, but the latter does a significantly better
job when it comes to the recent rise in inequality, confirming the potential ex-
planatory role for market size. While neither matches the historical dispersion
measure’s dramatic fall in the 1940s, this is perhaps unsurprising given the ab-
stract nature of the model and the simplistic assumptions on technical change
and skill distributions. Neither do the simulations do capture the market size
18Macunovich (1998) has argued that the macroeconomic eﬀects of the baby boom have
been underestimated, although she emphasises the impact of the changing age distribution on
the nature of demand.
19 See Kim (1999) for an overview of urban development in the US. While urbanisation was
at its fastest in the first half of the twentieth century, and the proportion of the population
living in large cities peaked around 1960, the proportion living in metropolitan areas continued
to rise throughout. Lang and Dhavale (2004) report that,as of the 2000 Census, 53 per cent
of all the land area in the continental United States comprise either metropolitan or the
newly-defined ‘micropolitan’ areas, so that rural areas constitute a minority share for the first
time.
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eﬀects of urbanization, global conflict and a changing trade environment20.
Figure 5 provides three snapshots of the simulated income distribution at
1900, 1950 and 2000, assuming growth in n. Consistent with the discussion
above, high-λj agents have the highest relative incomes in 1900; as δ and n grow,
µj becomes more important until by 2000 the high-µj agents constitute the rich.
Another view of the decline in importance in general ability is provided in Figure
6, which graphs the evolution of the relative incomes of selected individuals.
Figure 7 repeats the exercise for individual choices of rj and confirms that it
is not necessarily the high-µj agents who specialize the most in equilibrium;
after about mid-century the product range of a high-µj agent exceeds that of
his low-µj counterpart, holding λj fixed. As δ rises, the high-µj superstars are
so productive at low rj that they become the equilibrium generalists, for the
same reason that high-λj renaissance men were at low δ: to do otherwise would
drive prices down too far.
The simulations reported so far assume an unchanging distribution of the µj
and λj parameters. However, an undoubted source of variation in US inequality
is change in relative skill endowments. The ‘high school movement’ saw a signif-
icant increase in secondary school enrolment and graduation between 1910 and
1940 [Goldin and Katz (1999b)]. The post-baby boom era saw college enrolment
rates similarly rise. As discussed above, the latter phenomenon has motivated
the literature on skill-biased technical change, as the increase in the relative
supply of graduates was accompanied by a rise in the return to a college educa-
tion. In the current model a greater relative supply of high-µj workers naturally
implies a rise in such workers’ relative earnings, even absent any change in δ.
High-µj superstars are more productive, all else equal, and so a larger propor-
tion of them will raise market size x
α
. As we have seen, superstars are also those
who gain most from larger markets.
To confirm this intuition, I simulate an economy with two distinct groups
of workers, endowed with returns to specialization of 0.05 and 0.35 respectively.
Heterogeneity along the λj skill dimension is shut down for simplicity. Figure 8
graphs the relative earnings of the high-δj group - the skill premium - against
the fraction of the population the group constitutes. At least along the δj
dimension, the skill premium is increasing in the relative supply of skill.
20For low levels of δ the earnings distribution is determined largely by the λj parameters; the
[0.2, 1.8] spread for the λj was chosen to generate an equilibrium log-wage ratio of about 1.5 at
the start of the (simulated) sample period. The choices of uniform distribution, normalisation
of initial n to 100 and constant growth in δ were deliberately arbitrary. Given these choices, the
[0.75, 1.25] spread for the µj implied the best approximation for the observed log-wage ratio,
although I found that the U-shaped timepath for inequality was robust across a wide selection
of such spreads. Allowing for alternative distributions of the λj and µj , normalisations of n
and, especially, varying growth rates for δ would presumably result in better approximations
still.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In the model above the evolution of the earnings distribution is not governed
by variations in a single skill premium. Instead it is the relative return to
diﬀerent aspects of ability that change over time. As market size rises the
reward structure shifts in favour of specialist skills, in such a way as to mimic
the timepath of US inequality. The approach taken here has at its core the
individual specialization decision in general equilibrium. I conjecture that the
results relating to market size, technical change and the income distribution
would carry over to a setting where firms existed to partially coordinate the
actions of dispersed agents.
Making the model here explicitly dynamic, for example by introducing cap-
ital accumulation, would be useful insofar as it endogenized technology and
related the skill parameters here to observable variables. It was shown that
fundamental productivity α is distribution-neutral, but that a secular increase
in the aggregate return to specialization δ could help explain the evolution of
US earnings inequality. This is a hypothesis about the qualitative nature of
technical progress, and as such is open to debate. To the extent that increas-
ing division of labor is a natural consequence of economic progress - thanks to
population growth, urbanization, lower transportation costs and greater inter-
national trade - one might expect technical change to be directed in such a way
as to most improve the productivity of specialists and increase δ. In the spirit
of Acemoglu (1998), increasing specialization thanks to increased market size
may stimulate technical change that is biased towards such specialization21.
There are a couple of significant features of the recent evolution of the US
income distribution that the simulations reported here do not replicate. The first
is the increase in earnings instability, with the transitory variance of wages rising
significantly since the 1970s [Katz & Autor (2000), Section 2.5]. Augmented by
good-specific demand shocks, the model here would presumably predict such
higher wage volatility as the flip-side of increased specialization.
The second unexplained feature is the fall in earnings in the lower tail over
the last 30 years or so. The importance of market size for the specialization
decision suggests a possible explanation. It was shown how, if agents sort across
space, the ghost-town eﬀect leads the output of low-ability agents actually to
fall when those of high ability move away. This could be extended to a setting
where agents sort along other dimensions such as product quality, with economic
growth leaving the low-skilled isolated in thin markets for low-quality goods.
Embedding the ideas here in a dynamic model of vertical product diﬀerentiation
seems a logical next step.
21Acemoglu provides a model where an increase in the supply of skilled labour induces
skilled-bias technical change in such a manner.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of first-order condition (6)
Diﬀerentiate agent j’s objective function (4) with respect to xij :
δΓ
δxij
=
δV (P, Yj)
δYj
δYj
δxij
+
δV (P, Yj)
δpi
δpi
δxi
− λ. (24)
One may then use Roy’s Identity to get (5) in the text. To obtain (6),
recall that any equilibrium is characterised by the same total output of each
variety. As a result the behaviour of others that j takes as given is summarised
by identical output - in his absence - in each surrounding market. Given such
behaviour, as j expands his range of production, (5) implies that he will produce
the same amount xij =
a(rj)
rj
of each good. Recognising that output-per-variety
will thus depend on the product range, diﬀerentiate (4) with respect to rj to
obtain the following optimality requirement:
δΓ
δrj
≈ δV (P, Yj)
δYj
"
pmxmj +
Z
i∈Rj
δYj
δxij
· δx
i
j
δrj
di
#
+ xmj
δV (P, Yj)
δpm
· δp
m
δxm
+
Z
i∈Rj
δV (P, Yj)
δpi
· δp
i
δxi
· δx
i
j
δrj
di
− λ
"
xmj +
Z
i∈Rj
δxij
δrj
di− da (rj)
drj
#
= 0 (25)
where m is the marginal market into which agent j enters as his production
locus expands22 . Note that the beneficial implications for j’s budget set, hold-
ing Yj constant, of entering a new market m and thereby driving down pm are
approximated as xmj
δV (P,Yj)
δpm
δpm
δxmj
. This simplifies the analysis considerably and
will hold almost exactly for
xmj
xm suﬃciently small; when preferences are Cobb-
Douglas, as assumed in the bulk of the paper, it is equivalent to a first-order
Taylor approximation. Using (5) and once again the fact that in equilibrium
xij = xj =
a(rj)
rj
, xi = x, ∀i, j, one can rearrange (25) to obtain (6). The as-
sumptions on εaj (.) - that it is less than one and non-decreasing in rj - guarantee
that second-order conditions hold.
Note that Γj is in fact discontinuous at equilibrium rj ,since if j increases
his product range any further he goes from markets with output of (x− xj) to
ones with output of x in his absence. There may therefore be other equilibria in
the neighbourhood of that defined by Result 1. I focus throughout on equilibria
where (6) is satisfied exactly for all agents.
22 Strictly speaking, as rj rises j enters two new markets, since Rj must be centred on j’s
location on the variety circle. With symmetric varieties and constant output across markets,
though, (25) delivers the correct result.
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6.2 Proof of Result 2
Using (10), individual output levels can be characterised as functions of total
output x:
aj (rj) = rjxj =
rj
1− rj
δjx = f
−1
j (aj (rj)) δjx (26)
where f−1j (.) is the inverse of fj (.). Define a new set of functions qj (z) =
z
f
−1
j (z)
, so that:
x =
Z n
0
aj (rj) dj =
Z n
0
q−1j (δjx) dj. (27)
Recognising that the homogeneity of the fj (.) in turn implies qj (z) =
1
f
−1
j (αj)
α
− 1−δjδj
j z
1
δj , homogeneous of degree 1
δj
, then delivers (11) in the text.
Equations (12) and (13) are similarly obtained. The assumption δn > λj
µj
guar-
antees that
µjδ
λj
· x
α
> 1 and therefore that rj ∈
¡
0, 12
¢
, ∀j.
6.2.1 per capita output, market size and α, δ, n
Once it is noted from (11) that equilibrium x
α
is independent of α, (12) confirms
that per capita output x
n
is increasing in α. For the aggregate increasing returns,
note that the arrival of an additional, representative agent with λj = µj = 1
must lead to an increase in x
α
by (11). This will increase equilibrium productivity
of other agents by (12), and so x
n
must rise with n. Finally, for per capita output
to be increasing in δ it is enough that x
α
is so increasing, again from (12). This
must be the case because for 1 =
R n
0
δj
h
δjx
αj
iδj−1
dj to hold as the δj rise the
δjx
αj
terms under the exponent must be rising at a greater propotional rate than
are the δj .
6.2.2 equilibrium product range
From (13) it is clear that rj rises with λj , so that in cross-section the high-λj
agents are most diversified, all else equal - the renaissance man result.
The eﬀect of µj in cross section is not so straightforward, since:
sign



d
h
1
rj
i
dµj


 = sign
½
−δ ln
·
µjδ
λj
· x
α
¸
+
1− µjδ
µj
¾
. (28)
For low µj and low δ and
x
α
, then, increases in µj are associated with greater
specialisation. However, at high enough µj the converse may hold: especially if
δ and x
α
are large, further increases in µj may reduce specialisation, for much
the same reason that high-productivity renaissance men are less specialised in
equilibrium. High-µj superstars may be so productive at low rj that they flood
their markets, and so must diversify a little.
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A similar eﬀect is present when one moves away from the cross-section and
instead considers an increase in δ. Specialisation must increase in some average
sense, given that we may rewrite (13) as:
1 =
Z n
0
µjδ
rj
1− rj
dj. (29)
However, it is possible that for some particularly high-µj agents the increase
in productivity is great enough to induce them to diversify.
This, coupled with the cross-sectional analysis, suggests that two things will
occur as δ rises: specialisation will generally increase, and the economy will
change from one where the high-µj agents are specialists to one where they
are the more diversified in their product ranges. This is confirmed in Figure
7, and would make inference of the λj and µj parameters problematic even if
time-series data on rj were available.
6.3 Migration
Consider a simplistic economic geography model with two locations, Metropo-
lis and Backwater. Their initial populations are nM and nB respectively, with
nM > nB. The return to specialisation is δ for all agents, but fundamental
productivity varies; in each location the αj are uniformly distributed between
0 and 1 over the respective populations. Geography is such that the two cities
constitute distinct economies. There is no flow of goods between them - a con-
venient way of capturing transport costs - so agents must produce and consume
entirely within their home market.
Now introduce the possibility of migration from Backwater to Metropolis
only; this rules out expectations-driven equilibria. Backwater residents are able
to move permanently to Metropolis at cost c in terms of consumption goods
foregone, there to take advantage of the larger market by narrowing their prod-
uct range. Time is continuous and agents are infinitely-lived, discount the future
at rate ρ and compare lifetime real incomes in the two cities when making their
independent migration decisions.
The most productive in Backwater, with αj = 1, will be the most likely
to move to the larger market: while their relative income increase is identical
to that of their less-productive fellow residents, their absolute gain is greater.
Assume that c is low enough that at least some leave for Metropolis. Using (15)
and the assumption that the αj are uniformly distributed, one can show that
all j such that αj > bα will migrate, with bα defined by:
bα1−δ "·1 + nM
nB
− bα2−δ¸ δ1−δ − hbα2−δi δ1−δ # = ρc ·nB δ
2− δ
¸− δ2−δ
. (30)
Implicit in (30) is that potential migrants anticipate real income flow of the form
(16) but do not internalise their eﬀects on the size of the Metropolis economy.
Since bα > 0, the least productive inhabitants of Backwater will remain. As
noted in the text, their productivity will fall as their home market has shrunk,
24
while the productivity both of the migrants and the Metropolitan incumbents
will rise.
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Figure 1: Inequality and Employment in the US, 1900-2000
civemp = US civilian employment (left-hand axis, millions) [source: NBER histor-
ical database, series 08171a and 18171b (1900-1940), and Bureau of Labor Statistics
series LNS12000000 (1950-2000)]; log 90-10 = log weekly wage of full-time, full-year,
non-agricultural workers, with bottom 1% omitted; ratio of 90th to 10th percentiles
(right-hand axis) [source: Katz & Autor, Table 8].
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Figure 2 - Per capita output, δ and n
δ ∈ [0.05, 0.35], n ∈[100, 500].
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Figure 3 - log 75-25, δ and n
δ ∈ [0.05, 0.35], n ∈[100, 500]; log 75-25 = log-wage ratio of the 75th and 25th
percentiles.
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Figure 4 - Simulated log 90-10 with population growth and
specialisation-biased technical change
log 90-10 = log-wage ratio of the 90th and 10th percentiles; sim = simulations of
log 90-10 assuming growth in δ (= 0.05 in 1900, increases by 0.03 every decade) and n
(= 100 in 1900, growth calibrated to match civemp in Figure 1); simnopop = as sim,
but with n = 100 throughout; actual = data series from Figure 1.
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Figure 5 - Snapshots of simulated income distribution in 1900, 1950 and 2000
indout = individual output relative to average in 1900, 1950 and 2000, based on
sim from Figure 4; λ ∈ [0.2, 1.8], µ ∈ [0.75, 1.25].
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Figure 6 - Simulated relative incomes of selected agents, 1900-2000
timepaths for indout for selected agents, 1900-2000, based on sim from Figure 4;
µh = 1.125, µav = 1, µl = 0.875, λh = 1.4, λav = 1, λl = 0.6.
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Figure 7 - Simulated choice of product range for selected agents, 1900-2000
timepaths for rj for selected agents, 1900-2000, based on sim from Figure 4; µh =
1.125, µav = 1, µl = 0.875, λh = 1.4, λav = 1, λl = 0.6; note that absolute rj falls
for all agents over the period, with mean product range falling from 0.164 in 1900 to
0.005 in 2000.
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Figure 8 - The skill premium is increasing in the relative supply of skills
based on simulated economy with n = 100 and two groups of workers, with δj =
0.05 and 0.35 respectively and αj = 1 for all agents; skillprem = equilibrium output
of high-δj group relative to low-δj group.
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